13. In our opinion, the only issue which has to be examined is whether the late father of the respondent who admittedly was employed as a work-charged/contingency employee in the Tribal Welfare Department was entitled to the compassionate appointment as per the existing policy on the date of his demise.

14. It is trite to say that there cannot be any inherent right to compassionate appointment but rather, it is a right based on certain criteria, especially to provide succor to a needy family. This has to be in terms of the applicable policy as existing on the date of demise, unless a subsequent policy is made applicable retrospectively. [State of Gujarat & Ors. v. Arvindkumar T. Tiwari & Anr., (2012) 9 SCC 545]

15. Insofar as providing succor is concerned, unfortunately, since the demise of the late father of the respondent, 11 years have passed and really speaking, the aspect of providing succor to the family immediately does not survive. We have still examined the matter in the conspectus of the applicable policy. It is not in question that the Policy prevailing was one dated 18.8.2008. Clause 12.1 clearly proscribes workcharge/contingency fund and daily wager employees from compassionate appointment. The gravamen of the submission of the respondent is based on the classification of his late father as a permanent employee on account of having worked for more than 15 years and the consequent regularisation of his service.

16. In our view, the aforesaid plea misses the point of distinction between a work-charged employee, a permanent employee and a regular employee. The late father of the respondent was undoubtedly a workcharged employee and it is nobody’s case that he has not been paid out of work-charged/contingency fund. He attained the status of a permanent employee on account of having completed 15 years of service, which entitled him to certain benefits including pension and krammonati. This will, however, not ipso facto give him the status of a regular employee.

17. In the aforesaid behalf, an analogy can be drawn with the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1963, under which employees can be classified as permanent, permanent seasonal, probationers, badlis, apprentices, temporary and fixed-term employment employees. A work-charged contingency employee can also be classified under any of the aforementioned categories and under the said Standing Orders, the classification as permanent can be granted even on the completion of 6 months service in a clear vacancy. 18. We are not required to labour much on the aforesaid issue and really speaking this issue is no more res integra in view of the judgment of this Court in Ram Naresh Rawat v. Ashwini Ray & Ors., (2017) 3 SCC 436 10  which opined that a ‘permanent’ classification does not amount to regularisation. The case dealt with the aforesaid Standing Orders and it has been observed in paras 24, 26 & 27 as under:

“24. It is, thus, somewhat puzzling as to whether the employee, on getting the designation of “permanent employee” can be treated as “regular” employee. This answer does not flow from the reading of the Standing Orders Act and Rules. In common parlance, normally, a person who is known as “permanent employee” would be treated as a regular employee but it does not appear to be exactly that kind of situation in the instant case when we find that merely after completing six months’ service an employee gets right to be treated as “permanent employee”. Moreover, this Court has, as would be noticed now, drawn a distinction between “permanent employee” and “regular employee”. xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
26. From the aforesaid, it follows that though a “permanent employee” has right to receive pay in the graded pay-scale, at the same time, he would be getting only minimum of the said pay-scale with no increments. It is only the regularisation in service which would entail grant of increments etc. in the pay-scale.
27. In view of the aforesaid, we do not find any substance in the contentions raised by the petitioners in these contempt petitions. We are conscious of the fact that in some cases, on earlier occasions, the State Government while fixing the pay scale, granted increments as well. However, if some persons are given the benefit wrongly, that cannot form the basis of claiming the same relief. It is trite that right to equality under Article 14 is not in negative terms (See Indian Council of Agricultural Research & Anr. v. T.K. Suryanarayan & Ors. [(1997) 6 SCC 766]”

19. The conclusion to be drawn from the aforesaid is that attaining the status of permanent employee would entitle one only to a minimum of the pay-scale without any increments. It is this aspect which was sought to be emphasised by learned counsel for the respondent to contend that this would not apply, because in the present case, krammonati and increments were given. However, we may note that in the order dated 7.2.2002 granting the benefit of monetary krammonati to employees, including the respondent’s father, it was specified that the same would not affect the posts of such employees.

20. The moot point, thus, is that having been granted increments, could a person be said to have reached the status of a regular employee? In order to answer this question, we may note that while considering this aspect in the aforesaid judgment, it was specifically opined that even “if some persons are given the benefit wrongly, that cannot form the basis of claiming the same relief. It is trite that right to equality under Article 14 is not in the negative terms.” We say so, not with the objective of giving a licence to the appellants to withdraw any of the benefits, which are already granted, and we make this unequivocally clear. However, we cannot at the same time make a conclusion that the status acquired is that of a regular employee upon having achieved the status of a permanent employee in service.

21. Thus, the classification of the late father of the respondent as a permanent employee, and this distinction between a ‘permanent’ status and a ‘regular’ status appears to have been lost sight of in the impugned judgments.

22. We may also notice the reliance placed by learned counsel for the respondent on certain other cases where orders similar in nature were passed by the High Court and an SLP against one of these orders was dismissed, but then we have already observed that this will not give a right for perpetuating something which is not permissible in law.

23. We had the occasion of examining the issue of compassion appointment in a recent judgment in Indian Bank & Ors. v. Promila & Anr. (2020) 2 SCC 729 13. We may usefully refer to paras 3, 4, & 5 as under:

“3. There has been some confusion as to the scheme applicable and, thus, this Court directed the scheme prevalent, on the date of the death, to be placed before this Court for consideration, as the High Court appears to have dealt with a scheme which was of a subsequent date. The need for this also arose on account of the legal position being settled by the judgment of this Court in Canara Bank & Anr. v. M. Mahesh Kumar, (2015) 7 SCC 412, qua what would be the cut-off date for application of such scheme.
4. It is trite to emphasise, based on numerous judicial pronouncements of this Court, that compassionate appointment is not an alternative to the normal course of appointment, and that there is no inherent right to seek compassionate appointment. The objective is only to provide solace and succour to the family in difficult times and, thus, the relevancy is at that stage of time when the employee passes away.
5. An aspect examined by this judgment is as to whether a claim for compassionate employment under a scheme of a particular year could be decided based on a subsequent scheme that came into force much after the claim. The answer to this has been emphatically in the negative. It has also been observed that the grant of family pension and payment of terminal benefits cannot be treated as a substitute for providing employment assistance. The crucial aspect is to turn to the scheme itself to consider as to what are the provisions made in the scheme for such compassionate appointment.”

24. We are, thus, unable to give any relief to the respondent, much as we would have liked under the circumstances, but are constrained by the legal position. The family of the late employee has already been paid the entitlement as per applicable policy.

25. We may, however, notice a subsequent development arising from certain additional documents placed on record pertaining to the amendment to the policy of 18.8.2008 vide Circular dated 29.9.2014. In terms of this Circular, the compassionate grant amount was increased from Rs. 1,00,000/- to Rs. 2,00,000/-. Another Circular was issued on 31.8.2016, through which, a decision was taken that the dependents of deceased employees drawing a salary from the workcharged/contingency fund would be entitled to compassionate appointment, but it was clarified vide Circular dated 21.3.2017 that pending cases before the date of the 31.8.2016 Circular would be decided only in terms of the amended Policy dated 29.9.2014. That being the position, this last Circular also does not come to the aid of the respondent as it would amount to making the policy retrospectively applicable, while the Circular says to the contrary.

26. We, however, are of the view that we can provide some succor to the respondent in view of the Circular dated 21.3.2017, the relevant portion of which reads as under:

“2. In this regard, it is clarified that the compassionate appointment for the employees of Workcharge and Contingency Fund is in force also w.e.f. 31.08.2016. And the cases pending before this date, will be decided only in accordance with the directions issued for compassionate appointment on 29.09.2014, i.e., they will be eligible only for compassionate grant and not the compassionate appointment. The proceedings be ensured accordingly.”

27. The aforesaid Circular records that pending cases will be decided in accordance with the directions issued for compassionate appointment on 29.9.2014. The present case is really not a pending case before the authority, but a pending lis before this Court.

28. We are, thus, of the view that it would be appropriate to use our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do complete justice between the parties by increasing the amount from Rs. 1,00,000/- to Rs. 2,00,000/- as aforesaid. We, in fact, adopted a similar approach in Punjab State Power Corporation Limited & Ors. v. Nirval Singh (2019) 6 SCC 774.