23. Further, the orders passed by an authority could be ratified subsequently by the Governor, after issuance of the same. In this regard, learned Advocate General relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 2015 (11) SCC 669 (National Institute of Technology Vs. Pannalal Choudhury), wherein it has been held as follows:

“29. The expression “ratification” means “the making valid of an act already done”. This principle is derived from the Latin maxim “ratihabitio mandato aequiparatur” meaning thereby “a subsequent ratification of an act is equivalent to a prior authority to perform such act”. It is for this reason, the ratification assumes an invalid act which is retrospectively validated.

30. The expression “ratification” was succinctly defined by the English Court in one old case, Hartman Vs. Hornsby (142 Mo 368 : 44 SW 242 at p.244 (1897) ) as under:

” ‘Ratification’ is the approval by act, word, or conduct, of that which was attempted (of accomplishment), but which was improperly or unauthorisedly performed in the first instance.”

31. The law of ratification was applied by this Court in Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta Vs. Union of India (1973 (2) SCC 543). In that case, the Chairman of the Board of Directors had terminated the services of the General Manager of a Company pursuant to a resolution taken by the Board at a meeting. It was not in dispute that the meeting had been improperly held and consequently the resolution passed in the said meeting terminating the services of the General Manager was invalid. However, the Board of Directors then convened subsequent meeting and in this meeting affirmed the earlier resolution, which had been passed in improper meeting. On these facts, the Court held: (SCC pp.546-47, para 14):

“14. …. Even if it be assumed that the telegram and the letter terminating the services of the appellant by the Chairman was in pursuance of the invalid resolution of the Board of Directors passed on 16.12.1953 to terminate the services, it would not follow that the action of the Chairman could not be ratified in a regularly convened meeting of the Board of Directors. The point is that even assuming that the Chairman was not legally authorised to terminate the services of the appellant, he was acting on behalf of the Company in doing so, because, he purported to act in pursuance of the invalid resolution. Therefore, it was open to a regularly constituted meeting of the Board of Directors to ratify that action which, though unauthorised, was done on behalf of the Company. Ratification would always relate back to the date of the act ratified and so it must be held that the services of the appellant were invalidly terminated on 17.12.1953.”

That view was approved by this Court in High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan Vs. P.P.Singh (2003 (4) SCC 239 = 2003 SCC (L&S) 424.

32. The aforesaid principle of law of ratification was again applied by this Court in Maharashtra State Mining Corpn. Vs. Sunil (2006 (5) SCC 96 = 2006 SCC (L&S) 926). In this case, the respondent was an employee of the appellant Corporation. Consequent to a departmental enquiry, he was dismissed by the Managing Director of the appellant. The respondent then filed a writ petition before the High Court. During the pendency of the writ petition, the Board of Directors of the appellant Corporation passed a resolution ratifying the impugned action of the Managing Director and also empowering him to take decision in respect of the officers and staff in the grade of pay the maximum of which did not exceed Rs.4700 p.m. Earlier, the Managing Director had powers only in respect of those posts where the maximum pay did not exceed Rs.1900 p.m. The respondent at the relevant time was drawing more than Rs.1800 p.m. Therefore, at the relevant time, the Managing Director was incompetent to dismiss the respondent. Accordingly, the High Court held (Sunil Vs. Maharashtra State Mining Corpn., 2005 SCC Online Bom 758 : 2006 (1) Mah.L.J. 495) the order of dismissal to be invalid. The High Court further held that the said defect could not be rectified subsequently by the resolution of the Board of Directors. The High Court set aside the dismissal order and granted consequential relief. The appellant then filed the appeal in this Court by special leave. Ruma Pal,J. speaking for the three-Judge Bench, while allowing the appeal and setting aside the order of the High Court held as under: (Sunil case-Maharashtra State Mining Corpn. Vs. Sunil, 2006 (5) SCC 96 = 2006 SCC (L & S) 926), SCC pp.96g-h & 97a-b):

“The High Court rightly held that an act by a legally incompetent authority is invalid. But it was entirely wrong in holding that such an invalid act could not be subsequently ‘rectified’ by ratification of the competent authority. Ratification by definition means the making valid of an act already done. The principle is derived from the Latin maxim ratihabitio mandato aequiparattur, namely, ‘a subsequent ratification of an act is equivalent to a prior authority to perform such act’. Therefore, ratification assumes an invalid act which is retrospectively validated.

* * * * In the present case, the Managing Director’s order dismissing the respondent from the service was admittedly ratified by the Board of Directors unquestionably had the power to terminate the services of the respondent. Since the order of the Managing Director had been ratified by the Board of Directors such ratification related back to the date of the order and validated it.”

33. Applying the aforementioned law of ratification to the facts at hand, even if we assume for the sake of argument that the order of dismissal dated 16.08.1996 was passed by the Principal and Secretary who had neither any authority to pass such order under the Rules nor was there any authorisation given by the BoG in his favour to pass such order yet in our considered view when the BoG in their meeting held on 22.08.1996 approved the previous actions of the Principal and Secretary in passing the respondent’s dismissal order dated 16.08.1996, all the irregularities complained of by the respondent in the proceedings including the authority exercised by the Principal and Secretary to dismiss him stood ratified by the competent authority (Board of Governors) themselves with retrospective effect from 16.08.1996 thereby making an invalid act a lawful one in conformity with the procedure prescribed in the Rules.

34. In such circumstances, the respondent’s grievance that the dismissal order had not been passed by the competent authority i.e. the BoG no longer survived.

35. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we differ with the view taken by the High Court and accordingly hold that the dismissal order dated 16.08.1996 was passed by the competent authority, namely, the BoG as prescribed in the Rules and hence it was legal and proper. It is accordingly upheld … … .. … …”