11. This section gives to the vendor or the lessor the right to rescission of the contract for the sale or lease of the immovable property in the same suit, when after a suit for specific performance is decreed, if the vendor or the lessor fails to pay the purchase money within the period fixed. This section seeks to provide complete relief to both the parties in terms of a decree of specific performance in the said suit without having resort to a separate proceeding. Therefore, a suit for specific performance does not come to an end on the passing of a decree and the court which has passed the decree for specific performance retains control over the decree even after the decree has been passed. Section 28 not only permits the judgment-debtors to seek rescission of the contract but also permits extension of time by the court to pay the amount. The power under this section is discretionary and the court has to pass an order as the justice of the case may require. It is also settled that time for payment of sale consideration may be extended even in a consent decree. This Court in Smt. Periyakkal and ors. Vs. Smt. Dakshyani, speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J. observed that even in a compromise decree, the court may enlarge the time in order to prevent manifest injustice, and to give relief to the aggrieved party against a forfeiture clause. The Court observed the following:

“4.……………. The parties, however, entered into a compromise and invited the court to make an order in terms of the compromise, which the court did. The time for deposit stipulated by the parties became the time allowed by the court and this gave the court the jurisdiction to extend time in appropriate cases. Of course, time would not be extended ordinarily, nor for the mere asking. It would be granted in rare cases to prevent manifest injustice. True the court would not rewrite a contract between the parties but the court would relieve against a forfeiture clause; And, where the contract of the parties has merged in the order of the court, the court’s freedom to act to further the ends of justice would surely not stand curtailed.”