Common intention

Ramesh alias Dapinder Singh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh [Criminal Appeal No.347 of 2021]

Common intention requires something to be done “in furtherance” of common intention to incur vicarious liability

Brief: The Hon’ble Court in the said decision has acquitted the accused of offence under section 324 read with 34 of IPC and altered it to section 323 read with 34 because the Hon’ble Court did not find the accused having acted “in furtherance” of the common intention.

RELEVANT PARAGRAPH

14. Going by the narration of PW1, accused Sadhu Singh and Nirmal Singh had abused him and his friends at the residence of his maternal uncle leading to a quarrel and scuffle. The appellant was not attributed presence and participation in such quarrel or scuffle.

15. In a situation where the overt acts were attributed to principal accused and not to a person accompanying such principal accused, the observations in some of the cases decided by this Court are:-

a) Dharam Pal and others v. State of Haryana [(1978) 4 SCC 440]
“15. A criminal court fastening vicarious liability must satisfy itself as to the prior meeting of the minds of the principal culprit and his companions who are sought to be constructively made liable in respect of every act committed by the former. There is no law to our knowledge which lays down that a person accompanying the principal culprit shares his intention in respect of every act which the latter might eventually commit. The existence or otherwise of the common intention depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The intention of the principal offender and his companions to deal with any person who might intervene to stop the quarrel must be apparent from the conduct of the persons accompanying the principal culprit or some other clear and cogent incriminating piece of evidence. In the absence of such material, the companion or companions cannot justifiably be held guilty for every offence committed by the principal offender. …”

b) Vithal Laxman Chalawadi and others v. State of Karnataka [(2010) 14 SCC 739]
“15. As regards the role of appellant Gangappa, the evidence on record suggests that he gave a chappal-blow to PW 6, the mother of the deceased Ramesh. There is no other overt act attributed to Appellant 3-accused who appears to have joined the melee when tempers ran high. The allegation that he exhorted Accused 1 and 2 to kill the deceased has not in our opinion been satisfactorily proved to justify his conviction for murder with the help of Section 34 IPC.
16. The nature of the evidence on record and the role that appellant Gangappa is alleged to have played, does not, in our opinion, establish that Appellant 3 shared the common intention with Nijappa and Vithal to commit the murder of deceased Ramesh. The conviction of Appellant 3-accused for the offence of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC is, therefore, not sustainable. The evidence, however, proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant, Gangappa assaulted PW 6 Putalavva with a chappal. His conviction under Section 323 IPC by the trial court and the High Court deserves to be affirmed.”

16. Having considered the entire material on record, in our view, it cannot be said with certainty that the appellant shared the common intention with accused Sadhu Singh and Nirmal Singh to commit the murder of the deceased or that the appellant had done something ‘in furtherance’ of the common intention of all. Giving him benefit of doubt, we absolve him of the liability under Section 34 of the IPC insofar as the charges under Sections 302 and 324 of the IPC are concerned. We, however, find him guilty of the offence punishable under Section 323 read with Section 34 of the IPC. Affirming such conviction and sentence, we grant benefit of doubt to the appellant and acquit him of all the other charges.

17. This appeal is, therefore, allowed to the aforementioned extent. If the appellant has undergone the sentence in respect of offence under Section 323 read with Section 34 of the IPC, he be set at liberty, unless his custody is required in connection with any other offence.