11. The sole question to be answered by the Court in the present appeals relates to   whether   the   High   Court, while dismissing   the   anticipatory   bail   applications   of   the respondents, could have granted them protection from arrest.

15. It is therefore clear that a Court, be it a Sessions Court or a High Court, in certain special facts and circumstances may decide to grant anticipatory bail for a limited period of time. The Court must indicate its reasons for doing so, which would be assailable before a superior Court. To do so without giving reasons, would be contrary to the pronouncement of this Court in  Sushila  Aggarwal  (supra). If the High Court had therefore   decided   to   allow   the   anticipatory   bail application of the respondents­accused herein, albeit for a limited period of 90 days, the task before this Court would have   been   somewhat   easier.   We   would   only   have   had   to assess the reasons assigned by the Court, if any, for the imposition of such special condition in terms of the judgment in Sushila Aggarwal (supra).

16.  However, in the present appeals, the High Court, after considering   the   facts   and circumstances   of   the   case, particularly the gravity and severity of the accusations against the respondents, rejected the application of the respondents-accused. It is after rejecting the application that the High Court chose fit to grant some relief to the respondents while directing them to surrender before the Trial Court to file a regular bail application within 90 days, by protecting them from any coercive action during that period. The appellants complainants are aggrieved by the same and are challenging the power of the Court to pass such a protective order after the dismissal of the anticipatory bail application.

21. When the proviso to Section 438(1), Cr.P.C. is analyzed in line with the above dictum, it is clear that the proviso does not create any rights or restrictions. Rather, the sole purpose of the proviso appears to be clarificatory in nature. It only restates, inter alia, the obvious proposition that unless an individual has obtained some protection from the Court, the police may arrest them. In line with the ruling in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia (supra), the   proviso   cannot   be   read   as constituting a bar on the power of the Court.

22. If the proviso to Section 438(1), Cr.P.C. does not act as a bar to the grant of additional protection to the applicant, the question still remains as to under what provision of law the Court may issue relief to an applicant after dismissing their anticipatory bail application.

23. Without going into the question of whether Section 438, Cr.P.C. itself allows for such a power, as it is not necessary to undertake such an exercise in the present case, it is clear that when it comes to the High Court, such a power does exist.   Section   482, Cr.P.C   explicitly   recognizes   the   High Court’s inherent power to pass orders to secure the ends of justice. This provision reflects the reality that no law or rule can possibly   account   for   the   complexities   of   life,   and   the infinite range of circumstances that may arise in the future.

24. We cannot be oblivious to the circumstances that Courts are   faced   with   day   in   and   day   out, while   dealing   with anticipatory bail applications. Even when the Court is not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to an accused, there may be circumstances where the High Court is of the opinion that it is necessary to protect the person apprehending arrest for some   time, due   to   exceptional   circumstances, until   they surrender before the Trial Court. For example, the applicant may plead protection for some time as he/she is the primary caregiver   or   breadwinner   of   his/her   family   members, and needs to make arrangements for them. In such extraordinary circumstances, when a strict case for grant of anticipatory bail is not made out, and rather the investigating authority has made out a case for custodial investigation, it cannot be stated that the High Court has no power to ensure justice. It needs no mentioning, but this Court may also exercise its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to pass such an order.

25. However, such discretionary power cannot be exercised in   an   untrammeled manner.   The   Court   must   take   into account the statutory scheme under Section 438, Cr.P.C., particularly, the   proviso   to   Section   438(1), Cr.P.C.,   and balance the concerns of the investigating agency, complainant and the society at large with the concerns/interest of the applicant. Therefore, such   an   order   must   necessarily be narrowly   tailored   to   protect   the   interests   of   the   applicant while   taking   into consideration   the   concerns   of   the investigating authority. Such an order must be a reasoned one.

26. The impugned orders passed by the High Court, in the present appeals, do not meet any of the standards as laid out above.  We say so for the following reasons:  firstly, after the dismissal of the anticipatory bail application, on the basis of the nature and gravity of the offence, the High Court has granted   the   impugned   relief   to   the respondents   without assigning any reasons.  Secondly, in granting the relief for a period of 90 days, the Court has seemingly not considered the concerns   of   the   investigating agency, complainant   or   the proviso under Section 438(1), Cr.P.C., which necessitates that the Court pass such an exceptional discretionary protection order for the shortest duration that is reasonably required. A period of 90 days, or three months, cannot in any way be considered to be a reasonable one in the present facts and circumstances.

27. The impugned orders therefore do not withstand legal scrutiny. The resultant effect of the High Court’s orders is that neither are the respondents found entitled to pre­arrest bail, nor can they be arrested for a long duration. During the said duration they can roam freely without being apprehensive of coercive action. We are thus of the view that the High Court committed a grave error in passing such protection to the respondents accused.   Such   a   direction   by   the   High   Court exceeds   its   judicial discretion   and   amounts   to   judicial largesse, which the Courts do not possess.