In The State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta [AIR 1952 SC 12], a Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court clearly spelt out the contours within which interim relief can be granted, and held as under:-

An interim relief can be granted only in aid of and as ancillary to the main relief which may be available to the party on final determination of his rights in a suit or proceeding. If the Court was of opinion that there was no other convenient or adequate remedy open to the petitioners, it might have proceeded to investigate the case on its merits and come to a decision as to whether the petitioners succeeded in establishing that there was an infringement of any of their legal rights which entitled them to a writ of mandamus or any other directions of a like nature; and pending such determination it might have made a suitable interim order for maintaining the status quo ante. But when the Court declined to decide on the rights of the parties and expressly held that they should be investigated more properly in a civil suit, it could not, for the purpose of facilitating the institution such suit, issue directions in the nature of temporary injunctions, under Art.226 of the Constitution. In our opinion, the language of Art.226 does not permit such an action. On that short ground, that judgement of the Orissa High Court under appeal cannot be upheld.

In Deoraj v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 2004 SC 1975, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, at para 12, held as under:-

Situations emerge where the granting of an interim relief would tantamount to granting the final relief itself. And then there may be converse cases where withholding of an interim relief would tantamount to dismissal of main petition itself; for, by the time the main matter comes up for hearing there would be nothing left to be allowed as relief to the petitioner though all the findings may be in his favour. In such cases the availability of a very strong prima facie case – of a standard much higher than just prima facie case, the considerations of balance of convenience and irreparable injury forcefully tilting the balance of case totally in favour of the applicant may persuade the Court to grant an interim relief though it amounts to granting the final relief itself. Of course, such would be rare and exceptional cases. The Court would grant such an interim relief only if satisfied that withholding of it would prick the conscience of the Court and do violence to the sense of justice, resulting in injustice being perpetuated throughout the hearing, and at the end the Court would not be able to vindicate the cause of justice. Obviously, such would be rare cases accompanied by compelling circumstances, where the injury complained of is immediate and pressing and would cause extreme hardship. The conduct of the parties shall also have to be seen and the Court may put the parties on such terms as may be prudent.

In State of U.P v. Ram Sukhi Devi [(2005) 9 SCC 733] the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that final relief cannot be granted by way of interim relief. Paragraph 8 of the said decision is extracted hereunder:

To say the least, approach of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench is judicially unsustainable and indefensible. The final relief sought for in the writ petition has been granted as an interim measure. There was no reason indicated by learned Single Judge as to why the Government Order dated 26.10.1998 was to be ignored. Whether the writ petitioner was entitled to any relief in the writ petition has to be adjudicated at the time of final disposal of the writ petition. This Court has on numerous occasions observed that the final relief sought for should not be granted at an interim stage. The position is worsened if the interim direction has been passed with stipulation that the applicable Government Order has to be ignored. Time and again this Court has deprecated the practice of granting interim orders which practically give the principal relief sought in the petition for no better reason than that of a prima facie case has been made out, without being concerned about the balance of convenience, the public interest and a host of other considerations. [See Assistant Collector of Central Excise, West Bengal v. Dunlop India Ltd. (1985 (1) SCC 260 at p. 265), State of Rajasthan v. M/s Swaika Properties (1985 (3) SCC 217 at p.224), State of U.P. and Ors. v. Visheshwar (1995 Supp (3) SCC 590), Bharatbhushan Sonaji Kshirsagar (Dr.) v. Abdul Khalik Mohd. Musa and Ors. (1995 Supp (2) SCC 593), Shiv Shankar and Ors. v. Board of Directors, U.P.S.R.T.C. and Anr. (1995 Supp (2) SCC 726) and Commissioner/Secretary to Govt. Health and Medical Education Department Civil Sectt., Jammu v. Dr. Ashok Kumar Kohli (1995 Supp (4) SCC 214).] No basis has been indicated as to why learned Single Judge thought the course as directed was necessary to be adopted. Even it was not indicated that a prima facie case was made out though as noted above that itself is not sufficient. We, therefore, set aside the order passed by learned Single Judge as affirmed by the Division Bench without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case we have interfered primarily on the ground that the final relief has been granted at an interim stage without justifiable reasons. Since the controversy lies within a very narrow compass, we request the High Court to dispose of the matter as early as practicable preferably within six months from the date of receipt of this judgment.