Pravin Kumar vs. Union of India and Ors. [Civil Appeal No. 6270 of 2012]

[10.09.2020] – Judicial Review – difference between disciplinary proceedings and criminal proceedings

Brief: In this the Supreme Court upheld the dismissal order of Appellant for charges of corruption and extra-constitutional conduct. The Court held that the threshold of judicial review under Article 32, 226, and 136 in service matters is quite high. The Court further held that the fact that CBI did launch criminal prosecution against the Appellant does not affect the disciplinary action of the department as both the proceedings belong to different realm, independent of each other.

Important Paragraphs

Scope of Judicial Review in Service Matters

25. Learned counsel for the appellant spent considerable time taking us through the various evidences­-on­-record with the intention of highlighting lacunas and contradictions. We feel that such an exercise was in vain, as the threshold of interference in the present proceedings is quite high. The power of judicial review discharged by Constitutional Courts under Article 226 or 32, or when sitting in appeal under Article 136, is distinct from the appellate power exercised by a departmental appellate authority. It would be gainsaid that judicial review is an evaluation of the decision­making process, and not the merits of the decision itself. Judicial Review seeks to ensure fairness in treatment and not fairness of conclusion. It ought to be used to correct manifest errors of law or procedure, which might result in significant injustice; or in case of   bias or gross unreasonableness of outcome.

28. It is thus well settled that the Constitutional Courts while exercising their powers of judicial review would not assume the role of an appellate authority. Their jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law, procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Put differently, judicial review is not analogous to venturing into the merits of a case like an appellate authority.

29. The High Court was thus rightly concerned more about the competence of the enquiry officer and adherence to natural justice, rather than verifying the appellant’s guilt through documents and statements…..

Effect of criminal enquiry on disciplinary proceedings

33. The incident of 28.02.1999 raised serious questions of criminality under the Indian Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act, as well as of violation of Service Regulations and administrative misconduct. Thus, in addition to appointment of enquiry officer, the authorities also registered a criminal complaint with the CBI. After investigation, the CBI though did not find adequate material to launch criminal prosecution against the appellant but through its self-­speaking report dated 07.03.2000, the CBI recommended major disciplinary action against the appellant and a few others.

34. It is beyond debate that criminal proceedings are distinct from civil proceedings. It   is   both   possible and common in disciplinary matters to establish   charges   against a delinquent   official   by preponderance of probabilities   and   consequently terminate   his services. But the same set of evidence may not be sufficient to take away   his   liberty under our criminal   law   jurisprudence. Such distinction between standards of   proof   amongst civil   and   criminal litigation is deliberate, given the differences in stakes, the power imbalance between the parties and the social costs of an erroneous decision.

35. Thus, in a disciplinary enquiry, strict rules of evidence and procedure of a criminal trial are inapplicable, like say, statements made before enquiry officers can be relied upon in certain instances. The employer always retains the right to conduct an independent disciplinary proceeding, irrespective of the outcome of a criminal proceeding. Furthermore, the CBI report dated 07.03.2000 does recommend major disciplinary action against the appellant.   The said report also buttresses the respondent’s case.

Punishment and plea of leniency

36. In our considered opinion, the appellant’s contention that the punishment of dismissal was disproportionate to the allegation of corruption, is without merit. It is a settled legal proposition that the Disciplinary Authority has wide discretion in imposing punishment for a proved delinquency, subject of course to principles of proportionality and fair play. Such requirements emanate from Article 14 itself, which prohibits State authorities from treating varying degrees of misdeeds with the same broad stroke. Determination of such proportionality is a function of not only the action or intention of the delinquent, but must also factor the financial effect and societal implication of such misconduct.

But unlike in criminal cases, in matters of disciplinary proceedings Courts only interfere on grounds of proportionality when they find that the punishment awarded is inordinate to a high degree, or if the conscience of the Court itself is shocked. Thus, whereas imposition of major penalty (like dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank) would be discriminatory and impermissible for trivial misdeeds; but for grave offences there is a need to send a clear message of deterrence to the society. Charges such as corruption, misappropriation and gross indiscipline are prime examples of the latter category, and ought to be dealt with strictly.

37. Applying these guidelines to the facts of the case in hand, it is clear that  the punishment   of   dismissal from service is far from disproportionate to the charges of corruption,   fabrication and intimidation which have unanimously  been proven against the appellant. Taking any other view would be an anathema to service jurisprudence. If we were to hold that systematic corruption and its blatant cover­up are inadequate to attract dismissal from service, then the purpose behind having such major penalties, which are explicitly provided for under Article 311 of the Constitution, would be obliterated.