7. Section 19 of the Act states that while the arbitral tribunal is not bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, in the absence of any agreement between the parties as to the procedure to be followed, the arbitral tribunal may conduct the proceedings in the manner it considers appropriate. Section 18 mandates that both parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given a full opportunity to present his case. Reference can also be made to Sections 24 and 25 and newly enacted Section 29A of the Act, which though not applicable to this case, emphasise on quick and prompt adjudications. Idioms carping ‘delay’ and ‘hurry’ in adjudication highlight the importance of both speedy disposal and reasonable opportunity, as both are essential for an even-handed and correct decision. Neither should be sacrificed nor inflated, as to prolong or trample a just and fair adjudication. A pragmatic and common-sense approach would invariably check any discord between the desire for expeditious disposal and adequacy of opportunity to establish one’s case. In the context of the present case, we agree with the High Court that there was unnecessary haste and hurry by the arbitrator, especially when the respondent had filed the affidavit by way of evidence on 21st October 2010. Earlier, the respondent had filed written statement shortly after the appellant had filed the claim statement. The respondent was also deprived of reasonable and fair opportunity to cross-examine Paramdeep Singh (PW-1). The respondent had also moved an application for waiver of costs, which was rejected on 21st October 2010, albeit the arbitrator decided to continue the arbitration to proceed ex parte and adjourned the matter to 9th November 2010 for final arguments. As the evidence of the respondent by the way of affidavit was not taken on record, their contentions and evidence were not considered and thus debilitated the respondent from stating their case. Given the aforesaid factual position, there was violation of principles of natural justice and lack of full opportunity as envisaged by Section 18 of the Act, thereby, impeding a fair and just decision. Consequently, the award suffers and is liable to be set aside in terms of clause (iii) to Section 34(2)(a) as well as clause (ii) to Section 34(2)(b) of the Act.