CONCLUSIONS

36. At the cost of repetition, the law under Section 304­B, IPC read with Section 113­B, Evidence Act can be summarized below:

i. Section 304­B, IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind the legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and dowry demand.

ii. The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under Section 304­B, IPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable presumption   of   causality, provided   under   Section   113­B, Evidence Act operates against the accused.

iii. The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304­B, IPC cannot   be   construed to   mean ‘immediately   before’.   The prosecution   must   establish   existence   of “proximate   and   live link” between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives.

iv. Section 304­B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorizing death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that death occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances” can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.

v. Due to the precarious nature of Section 304­B, IPC read with 113­B, Evidence Act, Judges, prosecution and defence should be careful during conduction of trial.

vi. It is a matter of grave concern that, often, Trial Courts record the statement under Section 313, CrPC in a very casual and cursory manner, without specifically questioning the accused as to his defense. It ought to be noted that the examination of an accused under Section 313, CrPC cannot be treated as a mere   procedural   formality, as   it   based   on   the   fundamental principle of fairness. This aforesaid provision incorporates the valuable principle of natural justice “audi alteram partem” as it enables the   accused   to   offer   an   explanation   for   the incriminatory   material   appearing against   him.   Therefore, it imposes an obligation on the court to question the accused fairly, with care and caution.

vii. The Court must put incriminating circumstances before the accused and seek his response. A duty is also cast on the counsel   of   the   accused   to   prepare   his   defense since   the inception   of   the   Trial   with   due   caution, keeping   in consideration the peculiarities of Section 304­B, IPC read with Section 113­B, Evidence Act.

viii. Section 232, CrPC provides that, “If, after taking the evidence for   the   prosecution, examining   the   accused   and   hearing   the prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence, the Judge shall record an order of acquittal”. Such discretion must be utilized by the Trial Courts as an obligation of best efforts.

ix. Once the Trial Court decides that the accused is not eligible to be acquitted as per the provisions of Section 232, CrPC, it must move on and fix hearings specifically for ‘defence evidence’, calling upon the accused to present his defense as per the procedure provided under Section 233, CrPC, which is also an invaluable right provided to the accused.

x. In   the   same   breath, Trial   Courts   need   to   balance   other important considerations such as the right to a speedy trial. In this regard, we may caution that the above provisions should not be allowed to be misused as delay tactics.

xi. Apart from the above, the presiding Judge should follow the guidelines   laid   down by   this   Court   while   sentencing   and imposing appropriate punishment.

xii. Undoubtedly, as discussed above, the menace of dowry death is increasing   day by day.   However, it   is   also   observed   that sometimes family members of the husband are roped in, even though they have no active role in commission of the offence and are residing at distant places. In these cases, the Court need to be cautious in its approach.

37. In   light   of   the   above   findings, after   perusing   the   relevant material and the evidence available, we find that the High Court and Trial Court have not committed any error in convicting the appellants under Section 304­B, IPC as the appellants failed to discharge   the   burden   under   Section   113­B, Evidence Act. However, upon appreciation of facts and circumstances we are of the opinion that the offence under Section 306, IPC is not made out. We therefore set aside the conviction and sentence under Section 306, IPC.