16. It is true that this Court has held in a series of decisions that the wilful   breach   of   the   undertaking   given   to   the   Court   amounts   to contempt of Court under Section 2(b) of the Act. But the Court has always seen (i) the nature of the undertaking made; (ii) the benefit if any, reaped by the party giving the undertaking; and (iii) whether the filing of the undertaking was with a view to play fraud upon the court or to hoodwink the opposite party. The distinction between an order passed on consent terms and an order passed solely on the basis of an undertaking   given   to   court   and   the   distinction   between   a   person playing fraud on the court thereby obstructing the course of justice and a person playing fraud on one of the parties, was brought out by this Court in Babu Ram Gupta  vs. Sudhir Bhasin, in the following words:­

“…Indeed,   if   we   were   to   hold   that   non­compliance   of   a compromise decree or consent order amounts to contempt of court, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to execution of decrees may not be resorted to at all.  In fact, the reason why a breach of clear undertaking given to the court amounts to contempt of court is that the contemner by making a false representation to the court obtains a benefit for himself and if he fails to honour the undertaking, he plays a serious fraud on the court itself and thereby obstructs the course of justice and brings into disrepute the judicial institution.  The same   cannot, however,   be said   of   a   consent   order   or   a compromise decree where the fraud, if any, is practised by the person concerned not on the court   but on one of the parties. Thus, the offence committed by the person concerned is qua the party not qua the court, and, therefore, the very foundation for proceeding for contempt of court is completely absent in such cases.” 

25. It is true that an undertaking given by a party should be seen in the context in which it was made and (i) the benefits that accrued to the undertaking party; and  (ii)  the detriment/injury suffered by the counter party. It is also true that normally the question whether a party is guilty of contempt is to be seen in the specific context of the disobedience and the wilful nature of the same and not on the basis of the conduct subsequent thereto. While it is open to the court to see whether   the   subsequent   conduct   of   the   alleged   contemnor   would tantamount to an aggravation of the contempt already committed, the very determination of an act of contempt cannot simply be based upon the subsequent conduct.

26.   But the subsequent conduct of the party may throw light upon one important aspect namely whether it was just the inability of the party to honour the commitment or it was part of a larger design to hoodwink the court.

27. In this case, the series of acts committed by the petitioners (i) in issuing post­dated cheques, which were dated beyond the date within which they had agreed to make payment; (ii) in allowing those cheques to be dishonoured; (iii) in not appearing before the Court on the first date of hearing with an excuse that was found to be false;  (iv)  in coming up with an explanation about their own debtors committing default; and  (v)  in getting exposed through the report of the SFIO, convinced the High Court to believe that the undertaking given by the petitioners on 08.04.2015 was not based upon good faith but intended to hoodwink the Court. Therefore, we are unable to find fault with the High Court holding the petitioners guilty of contempt.