29. Reverting back to the facts of the present case, we have already adverted to clause 6(b) of the MoU dated 09.04.2014 which expressly provided that in the event of termination of the MoU, the appellant must refund all advances with interest at the rate of 21% per annum from the respective dates of disbursement till repayment. Thus, in the light of the express provision contained in clause (a) of subsection (7) of Section 31, the arbitral tribunal awarded interest in terms of the MoU from the date of the cause of action till the date of repayment. As the arbitral tribunal had expressly provided interest till the date of repayment, question of additional or compound interest under clause (b) of sub-section (7) of Section 31 of 1996 Act would not arise. The arbitral tribunal in its award dated 08.09.2019 has faithfully complied with the MoU agreed by and between the parties. Thus, the arbitral tribunal exercised its discretion within the overall framework of Section 31(7) of the 1996 Act aligning with the legislative intent that the award, rather than the statutory default, should govern the parties, more so in a case as in the present one where the parties have themselves made provision for interest throughout.

30. Therefore, reliance placed by the respondent on Hyder Consulting (supra) to claim post-award interest is misplaced. That principle would apply only when the arbitral tribunal leaves a matter unqualified or is silent. In the present case the arbitral tribunal bound by the MoU and exercising its statutory discretion had already specified the interest rate (21% per annum) and the duration (until repayment). As held in Morgan Securities and Credits Private Limited (supra), reaffirmed in Delhi Airport Metro Express Private Limited (supra) and explained in S.A. Builders Limited (supra), once parties agree on the interest regime, the arbitrator’s role is confined to enforcing it and the courts would not rewrite or enlarge the award by introducing further interest at the execution stage.

31. The MoU did not stipulate compounding of interest; the arbitral tribunal did not award compound interest; therefore, respondent cannot at the stage of execution seek to introduce claim of compound interest by drawing on general principles. Allowing such a claim would amount to rewriting the award at the stage of execution which is impermissible.