9. The position stated by us above is no longer under any manner of doubt. Granted that the nomination was in favour of respondent no.1, however, the condition stipulated in the nomination form rendered such nomination, at the time of death, void. In other words, the nomination itself would not give respondent no.1 a better claim over the total GPF amount than the appellant. While dealing with a case arising out of Insurance Act, 1938, this Court through E.S. Venkataramiah J. (as his Lordship then was) in Sarbati Devi v. Usha Devi, observed:

“12. … We approve the views expressed by the other High Courts on the meaning of Section 39 of the Act and hold that a mere nomination made under Section 39 of the Act does not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the life insurance policy on the death of the assured. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount, on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them.”

In Shakti Yezdani v. Jayanand Jayant Salgaonkar, this Court after referring to various precedents, dealing with the concept of nominations under different legislations observed as under:

“41. A consistent view appears to have been taken by the courts, while interpreting the related provisions of nomination under different statutes. It is clear from the referred judgments that the nomination so made would not lead to the nominee attaining absolute title over the subject property for which such nomination was made. In other words, the usual mode of succession is not to be impacted by such nomination. The legal heirs therefore have not been excluded by virtue of nomination.” (emphasis supplied)